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This work is based on one of the main experimental tasks that has seved as a 
primary focus of reasoning research: Wason´s THOG problem (Wason, 1977, 
1978; Wason & Brooks, 1979).  
 
The fundamental objectives are to present the main lines of empirical 
investigation, the most relevant theoretical explanations developed around this 
task and the repercussion which the research with the THOG problem has had 
for the general study of human reasoning. 
The original version of this metainference task is as follows: 
 
 In front of you are 4 designs: blue diamond, red diamond, blue circle and red 
circle:    
 
 
You are to assume that I have written  down one of the colours ( blue or red) 
and one of the shapes (diamond or circle). Now read the following rule carefully: 
“If, and only if, any of the designs includes either the colour I have written 
down or the shape  I have written down, but not both, then it is called a 
THOG”. I will tell you that the blue diamond is a THOG. Each of the designs 
can now be classified into one of the following categories: (a) definitely is a 
THOG;  (b) insufficient information to decide; (c) definitely is not a THOG.  
___________________ 
* This work was presented at 21st CONFERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY - ESCOP, celebrated in Tenerife, Spain (25-28 September 2019). 
 
 
Participants often failed to discover the righ answer, which was: “the red circle 
is a THOG and the other two designs are not”. The most commonly made biases 
are the intuitive errors: “Type A” (mirrors  the correct response and leads to the 
answer “the red circle is not a THOG and the other two designs are THOGs”), 
and “Type B” (“the red circle is not a THOG and there is insufficient information 
to decide about the other two designs”) (Griggs & Newstead, 1983).  
 ¿How reasoning with this task has been investigated?  
 
THE  THOG  PROBLEM:  SOME  EXPERIMENTAL  RESEARCH 
 
What  kind of variables might make it easier the THOG problem? Next table 
presents some of the main empirical studies that analysed different factors, such 
as the content of the task, the structure, the instructions, the scenario, the 
empirical knowledge and so on (Martín &Valiña, 2003).  
 
 
Some empirical research with the THOG problem, by chronological order. 
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THINKING  ABOUT  THOG:  THEORETICAL  EXPLANATIONS 
 
 Several explanations on THOG reasoning have been proposed. Some of these 
are more specific, such as the “Confusion Theory” (Girotto & Legrenzi, 1989) or 
the “Non-consequential reasoning” (Girotto & Legrenzi, 1993). From a general 
perspective, two theories of human inference that have explained the reasoning 
 
 
with this task are the Mental Models Theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 2000; 2012; 
2013; 2021; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009, 
2017; Quelhas, Rasga & & Johnson-Laird, 2019) and the Dual Process Theory 
(Evans, 2003, 2007, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021; Evans & Over, 1996; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). The Mental Models Theory proposes that subjects reason 
elaborating semantic representations or mental models from the meaning of the 
premises. The contents of clauses and general knowledge can modulate this 
meaning (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Quelhas & Johnson-Laird, 2017; 
Quelhas, Johnson-Laird, & Juhos 2010). Initially, sujects contemplate only 
models that express true situations (principle of true). This may be an added 
difficulty in disjunctive reasoning, where subjects need to “think what is false”. 
Any manipulation that makes a counterexample to a hypothesis more salient, 
should increase corresponding selections in tests of the hypothesis. According to 
Khemlani & Johnson-Laird (2019) subjects use strategies and fallible shortcuts 
when they reason. 
 
Focussing on the THOG problem, Mark Jones proposed an account of this task, 
which is based on the elaboration of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 2000). 
Concretely, from the initial information “Blue diamond is a THOG” subjects 
construct the mental models that represent only true models: 
  
   Diamond 
     Blue 
 
They incorrectly inferred that “the red diamond and the blue circle may be a 
THOG” because it has one of these characteristics, but they cannot be certain 
because the other characteristic (blue) could be the critical one. They infer that 
“the red circle cannot be a THOG” because it shares neither of these two 
 
 
features. The correct answer depends on fleshing out the initial models above in 
order to make explicit what is false: 
 
   Blue    ¬ Diamond 
   ¬Blue   Diamond 
 
The false cases in these two models can be replaced by their corresponding 
positive features: 
      
   Blue   Circle 
   Red  Diamond 
 
 The Dual Process Theory defends the existence of two cognitive processes. 
“Type 1”: quick, implicit and automatic processes, and “Type 2”: slow and 
explicit processes which require effort. Type 1 processes are responsible of 
heuristic strategies that may led to intuitive error in the Thog problem. Likewise, 
subjects can automatically activate pragmatic keys which contextualise the 
problem from beliefs or empirical knowledge. Type 2 processes are responsible 
for abstract, analytic and hypothetico-deductive reasoning, required by the 
formal solution to the THOG.  
 
 
THE  THOG  TASK  AND  BEYOND:  SOME  OPEN  QUESTIONS 
 
 Some key questions around the THOG task are the following: (1) Better 
performance is modutated by the activation of hypothetical thinking, 
related to the System 2 (Girotto y Legrenzi, 1993) or, on the contrary, is 
related to the attentional heuristics related to System 1? (Griggs, Platt, 
Newstead & Jackson, 1998; Koenig, Platt & Griggs, 2007); (2) ¿How can 
 
 
participants´cognitive capacity modulate reasoning with the THOG task? 
(Martín, Valiña, Seoane & Ferraces 1998; Seoane, Valiña, Rodríguez, Martín & 
Ferraces, 2007, Valiña, Seoane, Martín, Rodríguez & Ferraces, 2003); (3) What  
kind of variables might make it easier the THOG problem?; (4) Is thematic 
facilitation a good criteria for evaluating the comprehension of the task? 
(Koenig & Griggs 2004a, b, 2011; Koenig, Platt & Griggs, 2007); (5) What are 
the mental processes underlying the responses on the THOG task: 
reasoning, decision making, hypothesis testing or all? (Evans, 2007; Tversky 
& Shafir, 1992; Shafir & Tversky, 1992). 
 
     CONCLUSIONS 
 
 An important part of empirical researches on the THOG task, seem to 
emphasize the plasticity of the reasoning towards factors related to the content, 
the context and the empirical knowledge. To theoretical level, some of the main 
approaches that have explained the reasoning with this task are the Mental 
Models Theory and the Dual Process Theory. 
 
 Researhers´ interest in studying the THOG is not limited to understanding the 
problem per se. Empirical studies on this task has also contributed to “illuminate 
the nature of human rationality” (Khemlani & Johson-Laird, 2017) and to go 
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